Geomagnetically induced currents and their effect on power systems by Hutchins, Trevor
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GEOMAGNETICALLY INDUCED CURRENTS AND THEIR EFFECT 
ON POWER SYSTEMS 
BY 
 
TREVOR HUTCHINS 
THESIS 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of Master of Science in Electrical and Computer Engineering 
in the Graduate College of the 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2012 
Urbana, Illinois 
Adviser: 
 
 Professor Thomas J. Overbye 
 
ii 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
High-impact, low-frequency (HILF) events pose a threat to power grids 
around the world. For example, solar storms that generate coronal mass ejections 
can induce a change in the Earth’s magnetic field. Geomagnetically induced 
current (GIC) then enters the power grid and causes unusual real and reactive 
power flows, voltage fluctuations, frequency shifts, undesired relay operations, 
high third-harmonic currents and telemetry and supervisory alarm failures. A 
storm on the order of 5,000 nT/min could occur in the not too distant future. Once 
this storm occurs, widespread damage to the power grid of unprecedented 
proportions is expected to result. Mitigation strategies are required to protect the 
integrity of the power system. Mechanisms involved in system restoration need to 
be prioritized, and the effectiveness of existing black-start procedures needs to be 
assessed. The representation and simulation of GIC can be embedded into power 
flow software in order to the study of sensitivity and transient stability of the 
North American bulk power system under a geomagnetic disturbance (GMD). 
This thesis presents in-depth background on GMDs and how they affect the power 
grid. The thesis will continue into the modeling and simulation of GMDs and 
GIC. Lastly, a GMD scenario will be explored and an appropriate mitigation 
strategy will be explained. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
High-impact low-frequency (HILF) events currently pose a threat to the 
power grids around the world. Two HILF events of popular discussion include 
high-altitude electromagnetic pulse detonation (HEMP) and geomagnetic 
disturbances (GMDs) due to space weather. This thesis concentrates on the effect 
of GMDs on the power grid. The susceptibility of power grids to GMD events is 
an ever increasing problem. A single event, lasting just a few minutes, has the 
potential to cripple portions of the power grid for weeks, even years. 
The ability to assess the impact of GMDs on a power system is limited. 
Tools are not widely available for power engineers to make this assessment. The 
goal of this research is to develop algorithms for better modeling and mitigating 
the impacts of geomagnetically induced current (GIC) on the power grid. 
Comparing actual system measurements, including transformer neutral current, 
direct field measurements, and actual transformer losses, is a crucial part of this 
research as the algorithms are developed. This research will allow initial planning 
studies that will help push GMD assessment into the realm of power system 
planning and operations engineers. Powerful analysis methods such as transient 
stability analysis and power flow analysis can be taken advantage of by 
integrating a GMD tool into existing power flow and transient stability analysis 
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software. This will enable exploration of short term and long term mitigation 
strategies of GMD scenarios and their impact on the power grid. 
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND 
 
2.1 Geomagnetic Disturbances 
 
The geomagnetic disturbances of concern are solar storms, or solar flares. 
Associated with solar flares are coronal mass ejections. The ejection is plasma 
consisting mainly of protons and neutrons. The Earth’s magnetic field captures 
the charged particles approximately 20-40 hours after a flare occurs [1]. A violent 
change in the Earth’s magnetic field results, over a period of approximately five 
minutes, from the capture of the energized solar plasma. The Sun goes through 
11-year solar cycles, with solar activity increasing as the cycle nears its end; that 
is, the end of the cycle is more violent than the beginning [2]. The current solar 
cycle ends in 2012-2013, and the number of storms per year has also been 
increasing [2].  
The scale used to categorize the intensity of geomagnetic storms is the K-
index, or Kp-index. The K-index is a real-time estimate of the Kp-index, which is 
released only twice per month by the German GeoForschungsZentrum. The K-
index considers a minute by minute, three hour window of maximum horizontal 
component fluctuations of the Earth’s magnetic field, measured in nT [3]. The 
Kp-index is calculated by taking a weighted average of K-indices from a network 
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of geomagnetic observatories around the world. The index is severely outdated, 
created in 1932 [4]. The index is a nonlinear mapping of the horizontal 
component of the Earth’s magnetic field. Since most of these magnetometer 
readings are captured terrestrially, the readings will vary depending on the 
observatory latitude. Each observatory has a conversion table to convert the 
magnetometer readings to the appropriate K-index of that area. The index ranges 
from zero to nine, zero being the minimal GMD. 
The K-index suffers from a few key insufficiencies that could be mitigated 
by using new measurement equipment and techniques. The current scale’s 
bandwidth is too small, and the accuracy of the measurements could be improved 
with new technology. If an extended K-index scale existed, power system 
operators could be alerted more accurately. GMDs are measured in nT/min. At the 
Boulder Geomagnetic Observatory in Colorado, any storm greater than 500 
nT/min is classified as a Kp level 9 storm. The effects of a 500 nT/min storm and 
a 2400 nT/min storm can be very different, the latter, obviously, being 
significantly more devastating. Currently, several utilities are sent GMD warnings 
from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) when a 
potentially dangerous event is detected. According to NOAA, power systems can 
be perturbed by a storm with a Kp level of 5 or greater [3].  On average, 2600 
storms of Kp level 5 or greater happen during the 11-year solar cycle, four of 
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these being level 9 events [3]. As we will discuss later, in the last 100 years, 
storms have been recorded over a range of 500 nT/min to 5000 nT/min. 
The footprint of a GMD, which traces back to the Sun, can vary 
drastically. Parameters such as duration, size, direction and polarity, to name a 
few, of a solar flare all contribute to the final GMD footprint. Contouring the 
magnitude of the Earth’s magnetic field 
fluxuation provides a visual understanding 
of the storm’s impacted area. Figure 1 
shows the footprint from the 1989 Québec 
storm, with a magnitude of 500 nT/min. 
Figure 2 shows the footprint of a famous 
1921 storm, with a magnitude of 5000 
nT/min. The storms are most intense in the 
center and drop off nonlinearly in a radial 
fashion. The effects of these specific storms 
on electrical systems are discussed in 
Chapter 4.  
Figures 1 and 2 display contours of 
the two different storm magnitudes. These 
are ‘snapshots’ during two different storms. 
Figure 1. 1989 Quèbec 500 
nT/min storm [5] 
 
Figure 2. 5000 nT/min 
storm in 1921 [5] 
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Analogous to a rainstorm, the storm’s shape and orientation will be constantly 
changing throughout the disturbance. Figure 3 shows the changing magnitude of 
the 1989 Québec storm over 48 hours.  
 
            Graph taken from page 48 of [6] 
Figure 3. 1989 Québec storm magnitude 48 hour profile 
The storm’s polarity and orientation will change throughout a GMD. This 
change is realized as a changing magnetic field density vector field. The 
magnitude of this vector field at specific time intervals is what characterizes a 
“storm profile.” As the magnetic changes over time, different storm profiles will 
result.  
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2.2 Geomagnetically Induced Current 
 
Through Faraday’s law of induction, a changing magnetic field density 
through a defined area, or a changing flux, results in an induced EMF. In this 
case, the resulting EMF is given by a geomagnetic storm interacting with the 
Earth’s magnetic field over an incremental area, inducing geoelectric fields at the 
Earth’s surface and in the ground. The geoelectric fields drive quasi-dc currents in 
the ground through high voltage transmission lines, railway equipment, 
communication cables, and pipeline networks. The frequency of the current is 
significantly less than the frequency of the electrical grid, so it is said to be quasi-
dc. This current is more commonly known as geomagnetically induced current, or 
GIC. The modeling of GIC is discussed in Chapter 5. 
GIC is induced into the power grid when a geomagnetic storm interacts 
with the Earth’s magnetic field. This ionospheric interaction has the ability to 
perturb the auroral electrojets that circulate the Earth’s magnetic poles. These 
circulating electric currents, electrojets, leave their auroral oval when perturbed. 
The electrojets are extended at increased strength into the lower latitudes, 
imposing a geoelectric field, as mentioned before. The accumulated voltage 
difference between two low-impedance ground points in the power grid yields a 
current high enough to produce documented damage and power system instability 
to power grids [7]. 
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The easiest point of entry for GICs into the electric grid is through the 
grounded neutral wire of wye connected power transformers. These wires are 
physically grounded in the Earth. These low resistivity wires are the path of least 
resistance for GIC, when compared to the soil. The high voltage neutral 
connections are an even easier entry for GIC since their resistivity is less than that 
of the lower voltage transmission lines. Coincidentally, the higher voltage 
transformers are damaged easier by excess current flow. The transformers’ 
combination of most at risk and most easily damaged is not ideal for the power 
grid. 
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CHAPTER 3 
EFFECTS OF GEOMAGNETICALLY INDUCED CURRENTS ON POWER 
SYSTEMS
1
 
 
3.1 High Voltage Power Transformers 
 
Power transformers, static var compensators (SVCs), and switched 
capacitor banks are known to suffer from the effects of GIC [1]. Present day 
power transformers have been optimized to only require a few amps of ac exciting 
current. The exciting current generates the flux required for the voltage 
transformation. The amount of flux generated is closely related to the core 
material which, in the case of the power transformers of interest here, is steel. The 
steel core’s performance is non-linear, as seen in the voltage-current 
characteristics plot in Figure 4 [7]. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
Reprinted with permission from T. Hutchins, “The effect of geomagnetic disturbances on the electric grid and appropriate 
mitigation strategies,” in Proceedings of the North American Power Symposium, Boston, MA, 2011 [1]. 
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        Graph taken from [7] 
Figure 4. Steel core performance characteristics of a power transformer 
The transformer’s core is designed so that the transformer operates only in 
the linear region. However, under the distress of GIC, the transformer’s operating 
point can be shifted into the nonlinear/saturation region. At the voltage peaks, 
saturation is seen in the transformer’s voltage-current characteristics. As the 
magnitude of the voltage increases past the linear region, as seen in Figure 4, the 
voltage begins to saturate. With GICs entering the transformers, the exciting 
current increases significantly.  Positive GIC flow into the transformer severely 
saturates the positive cycle of the ac exciting current. Field tests from a 600 MVA 
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transformer, with 75 A of GIC entering the neutral connection, show an exciting 
current of approximately 300 A, as seen in Figure 5 [7].  
 
Graph taken from [7] 
Figure 5. Half cycle saturation in a 600 MVA transformer with 75 A of GIC 
flow 
12 
 
The waveform peaking at about 6 A represents a typical excitation current 
for the transformer. The current, after GIC has been introduced into the 
transformer, increased asymmetrically to nearly 300A. The operating point of the 
transformer is no longer in the linear region and it has been pushed far into the 
positive saturation region. The core is saturated and the flux begins to leak and 
couple to everything within reach, compromising the transformer’s physical and 
electrical integrity.  According to spectrum analysis, the asymmetric exciting 
current contains several even and odd harmonics [7]. These harmonics are capable 
of improperly triggering the power line’s relays, which is harmful for switched 
capacitor banks and static var compensators [8]. The distorted excitation current 
produces severe reactive power losses in the 600 MVA transformer, which suffers 
a reactive power loss of 50 Mvar with the excitation current of Figure 5 [7].  This 
translates into a voltage drop in the system that is of serious concern.  
Design of a transformer immune to GIC effects has been considered, but 
the design is cumbersome and the transformer’s core size is impractical [7]. 
Discussed later, a few issues arise when modeling these transformers in a GIC 
study. Key parameters of the transformer and substation grounding are needed to 
perform the most accurate GIC calculation, and these parameters are not always 
readily available. Educated guesses are made in order to provide an approximated 
GIC calculation, discussed in Chapter 5. In the future, these calculations can be 
validated with real field measurements. Utilities are currently interested in 
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installing GIC monitoring devices on key points in their systems. Once these 
devices have been installed, the calculations can be compared with magnetometer 
and GIC sensor readings. 
 
3.2 Static Var Compensators and Switched Capacitor Banks
 
 
 GIC has a significant effect on high voltage transmission lines as well as 
power transformers. By observing the transmission line equivalent π circuit, as the 
load increases, the reactive power consumed by the line increases with the square 
of the line’s current [9]. These long lines require support devices such as static var 
compensators (SVCs) and capacitor banks in an effort to keep the line at the rated 
voltage. With GIC present, the system is overloaded with reactive power. The 
voltage of the line drops, and the capacitor banks are switched into the system, as 
an effort to boost the voltage back to the rated value. The capacitor banks are 
charged and discharged by the power lines they are connected to through a system 
of breakers and relays. As mentioned before, the transformer generates unusual 
even and odd harmonics under GIC conditions [10]. These harmonics are capable 
of improperly triggering the relays, which results in the improper operation of the 
system’s breakers controlling the SVCs and capacitor banks [10]. During a GMD 
event, the capacitor banks and SVCs are unreliable and are likely to be destroyed 
from overcharging [10].  Without devices in the system to help recover from a 
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voltage drop, the voltage may continue to drop, resulting in the collapse of 
transmission lines, limiting the power transfer capabilities of the system. A 
domino effect of power outages can result from this large power loss, initiated by 
a GMD event [7]. 
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CHAPTER 4 
LEARNING FROM THE HISTORY OF GEOMAGNETIC DISTURBANCES 
 
4.1 Hydro Québec System Collapse of 1989
 
 
On March 13-14 of 1989, the Earth experienced a geomagnetic storm with 
a magnitude of 500 nT/min. This storm resulted in the collapse of the Québec 
Interconnection, and ultimately the entire Québec grid, which collapsed in 25 
seconds. The seven static var compensators online tripped, resulting in voltage 
drop of 0.2 p.u. Through loss of synchronism, the five lines to Montréal tripped, 
and the entire network separated [4]. The power outage did not extend beyond the 
Québec Interconnection to the rest of North America. However, power system 
anomalies were recorded around the globe during the next 24 hour period, 
including permanent damage to a transformer in New Jersey [4].  
In nine hours, 83% of the people affected by the storm in Québec had 
power restored. In total, 21,500 MW of load and generation were lost [4]. One 
generator step-up transformer was damaged from overheating due to GICs. If 
several of these key transformers are damaged, long term outages would be 
expected. The lead time of a high voltage step-up transformer is 12-24 months 
[4]. 
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In 1921, a geomagnetic disturbance of approximately 5000 nT/min, ten 
times the magnitude of the 1989 storm, is believed to have occurred [7]. A storm 
of this magnitude today would cause widespread damage to the electric grid of 
unprecedented proportions.  
There is some debate about how much a GMD event affects the 
transformers. Utilities have begun to consider the strategic installation of GIC 
measurement devices. These devices, coupled with Earth’s magnetic field 
variation data, and reactive power consumption of the transformer, will allow for 
model validation and improvement. These measurements will also help settle the 
debate on how severely the transformers are impacted by a GMD event. 
Understanding how and why the Québec grid collapsed is important when 
considering GIC mitigation strategies, discussed in Chapter 6. 
 
4.2 Financial Burden of a Geomagnetic Disturbance 
 
The cost of protecting the high voltage transformers in the grid is non-
trivial. The preferred method of protection is a topic of debate. The North 
American Electric Reliability Corporation believes the quickest, and most cost 
effective, way to protect the transformers is by adding a blocking capacitor or a 
switchable resistor to the neutral connection of the wye-connected transformers 
[4], [8]. This research is focused on the system impacts of these devices, not on 
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the devices themselves. There are several thousand high voltage transformers in 
the United States electric grid [11]. After cost-benefit analysis, the 
Electromagnetic Pulse Committee believes that switchable ground resistors are 
the best option to limit the GIC flow in transformers. The committee estimates the 
cost of the resistors to be between $75 million and $150 million [11], not 
including the cost of labor, the sensors used to detect the GIC, or the breakers 
used to switch in the ground resistors. Since the labor is to be scheduled at the 
same time of existing maintenance, the cost is substantially reduced from new 
maintenance orders. In total, the end cost of the units protected is $250 million to 
$500 million [11]. If a storm similar to the famous 1921 storm, approximately 
5000 nT/min, occurs in the near future, the National Academy of Sciences 
(NACS) estimates a total of 350 high voltage power transformers will be 
permanently damaged, resulting in a four to ten year recovery period [12]. The 
transformers are not manufactured in the United States, and this country does not 
have a sizeable inventory of the high voltage transformers. The transformers 
currently have a lead time of approximately 12 to 24 months [4]. Due to the 
physical size of the transformers, they must be brought to the installation location 
by rail. Many of the railroads used in the past are out of service or no longer exist 
[4]. During the four to ten year recovery period, 130 million people will be 
affected in the United States by power disruption [4]. Financially, this has the 
potential to be the biggest natural disaster the United States has ever faced, with 
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an estimated loss of $1 to $2 trillion. To put things into perspective, the August 
14, 2003, Northeast blackout cost the country between $4 and $10 billion [12].  
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CHAPTER 5 
MODELING GEOMAGNETICALLY INDUCED CURRENT
2
 
 
As mentioned before, the modeling of GIC begins with the interaction 
between the Earth’s atmosphere and the charged particles emitted by the Sun. 
This interaction results in an induced geoelectric field, an electric field induced at 
Earth’s surface. This geoelectric field then drives GIC through the power grid. 
 
5.1 Geoelectric Field Model 
 
There are several different methods for modeling the interaction between 
the Sun and the Earth’s magnetic field; two methods are described in [13] and 
[14]. As a starting point for this research, a crude model is used to develop the 
approximated base geoelectric field. The geoelectric field resulting from the 
model does not need to perfectly map the interaction of a geomagnetic 
disturbance. Rather, the modeling of the interaction needs to be accurate enough 
to produce reasonable, trending geoelectric fields, judged by historical data. The 
focus of this research is to translate reasonable geoelectric fields into GIC and 
then understand how that GIC affects a given system. 
                                                 
Reprinted with permission from T. Hutchins, “Power flow studies in the presence of geomagnetically induced currents,” in 
Proceedings of the Power and Energy Conference at Illinois, Urbana, Illinois, 2012 [21]. 
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The disturbance causes the Earth’s magnetic field to violently change. A 
non-uniform geomagnetic storm profile, characterized by the rate of change of the 
magnetic field density vector, B, in units of nT/min, serves as an input to the 
model. The user has the ability to define the magnitude and direction of the storm. 
The magnetic field density data used as an input is data that has been recorded 
terrestrially by magnetometers placed in substations. Not only will the model 
produce the induced geoelectric field, it will also calculate the accumulated 
voltage between user-defined geographic coordinates, which are usually the start 
and end points of transmission lines 
The model approximates the interaction between the Sun and the Earth’s 
magnetic field by use of Faraday’s law,  
∫
  
  
    
   
  
                                                     
The majority of interaction between the Earth’s magnetic field and the 
geomagnetic disturbance is assumed to happen 250 km above the Earth’s surface. 
Using a differential integration length of 1 km, the induced geoelectric field is 
found by integrating the rate of change of the magnetic field density vector over 
the differential area, from a user-defined reference point, to a user-defined end 
point. Due to the Earth’s varying ground conductivity, the induced electric field 
depends on the point of interest. Also, since the storm’s magnetic field is not a 
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uniform field, but rather changing in direction and/or magnitude, different points 
on the Earth could experience different induced geoelectric fields. 
Ground conductivity models, shown in Figure 6, are an important part of 
precisely mapping the geomagnetic disturbance to a geoelectric field. However, 
general operation and planning studies can be performed without the inclusion of 
a ground conductivity model. Uniform fields are a good starting point when 
studying grid operation under a GMD event. Ground conductivity models become 
more important when studying systems that span a large geographic region, such 
as interconnects. The ground conductivity varies significantly across North 
America, and depending on the ground type, the induced GIC can be significantly 
impacted. The model illustrated is based on the model in [6]. Layered 
conductivity profiles contribute to this two-dimensional model. Due to the low-
frequency nature of electromagnetic disturbances, ground conductivities of 
appropriate depths should be considered. Most importantly, the ground 
conductivity model is better developed by using actual measurements of 
geoelectric fields and the corresponding GIC at the areas of interest [6]. To 
illustrate how the ground conductivity changes across America, an example 
ground conductivity model is shown below in Figure 6, with the different colors 
representing different ground types in the United States. 
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Figure 6. Ground conductivity model of the U.S.A.  
Research efforts are under way to further develop the example model and 
to begin incorporating it in with GIC studies to more precisely model GIC. 
 
5.2 Voltage Source Calculation and Uniform Field Validation 
 
5.2.1 Voltage Source Calculation 
After the geoelectric field has been calculated for the areas of interest, the 
voltage accumulation between the geographical locations must be calculated. The 
voltage is seen as a voltage source in series with each line [15], but in the end, it is 
modeled as a Norton equivalent. Modeling the voltage source as its Norton 
equivalent allows for current injection integration into power flow and transient 
stability simulation software. The voltage source is calculated based on the 
geographical coordinates of the system’s transmission lines and the geoelectric 
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field generated by the model. The distance between the start and end points of 
each transmission line is multiplied by the areas geoelectric field to determine the 
voltage difference between the end points. As mentioned before, the model in this 
algorithm uses a quasi-finite element method with a resolution of approximately 
0.5 x 0.5 degrees. The voltage is calculated according to Equation (2). 
    ∮                                                                
In words, the induced voltage is calculated by integrating the projected electric 
field along a closed path, for example, transmission lines between grounded wye 
transformers. The dot product multiplication is very important, since this is how 
the angle/orientation of the storm is accounted for. How the modeled voltage is 
implemented is discussed in section 6.3. 
5.2.2 Uniform Field Validation 
The previous algorithms were implemented in MATLAB. To begin the 
validation of the model’s voltage source calculation, a uniform northward 
geoelectric field and an eastward geoelectric field are applied at separate times, 
representing two different storms, as seen in Equations (3) and (4). 
                                                                    
                                                                    
Equation (3) is a uniform northward field, vectorially South to North, with 
a constant magnitude of 1.0 V/km. Equation (4) is a uniform eastward field, 
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vectorially West to East, also with a constant magnitude of 1.0 V/km. Forcing the 
geoelectric field to 1.0 V/km allows for easy validation. Since the magnitude is 
1.0 V/km in both storms, the accumulated voltage will be equal to the distance in 
the South-North direction for Equation (3) and the West-East direction for 
Equation (4). The “actual” voltage source values were found by using the 
haversine formula to calculate the great-circle distance between two points. Since 
the geoelectric field is 1 V/km, the “actual” voltage source is equal to the “actual” 
distance calculated. Fictitious buses were assigned to the geographical coordinates 
listed in Table 1. It is assumed that each bus listed has a closed loop path between 
the ‘from’ bus and ‘to’ bus via transmission lines with grounded wye connections 
on either end.  
Table 1. Geographical coordinates of the system’s buses 
Line  
From 
Bus 
(degrees) 
To Bus 
(degrees) 
1 (30, -85) (33, -86) 
2 (31, -88) (35, -83) 
3 (30, -85) (35, -83) 
4 (34, -79) (34, -82) 
5 (36, -80) (35, 80) 
 
The results of the algorithm are compared to the “actual”, or haversine 
distance calculation, voltage source values in Table 2. The percent error is very 
small. For this brief uniform field validation, the calculated voltage sources are 
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nearly identical to the actual, or exact, voltage calculations, shown in Table 2. The 
error that does exist is attributed to the use of the Mercator projection. For 
preliminary studies, this estimate in the Mercator projection was sufficient; 
however, as the algorithms were worked into power flow simulation software, a 
more accurate distance calculator was required. 
Table 2. Uniform field validation results 
Line 
Northward 
Vsource 
Actual (V) 
Northward 
Vsource 
Model (V) 
Eastward 
Vsource 
Acutal 
(V) 
Eastward 
Vsource 
Model 
(V) 
Northward 
Vsource 
% Error 
(%) 
Eastward 
Vsource 
% Error 
(%) 
1 333 336 -90 -91.67 0.90 1.85 
2 444 448 449 458.34 0.90 2.08 
3 556 560 180 183.33 0.72 1.85 
4 0 0 -270 -275.00 0.00 1.85 
5 -111 -112 0 0.00 0.90 0.00 
 
 The algorithms have been further developed and directly implemented into 
PowerWorld Simulator in accordance with [16]. The calculation now accounts for 
the non-spherical shape of the Earth and uses the WGS84 Earth model, which is 
used in the GPS system [16]. More accurate distance calculations allow for higher 
accuracy in the induced voltage source calculations.  
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5.3 Modeling Geomagnetically Induced Currents 
 
Caution must be taken when considering the modeling of GIC. For 
uniform geoelectric fields, it is acceptable to model the induced voltage as voltage 
sources in the ground connection of the transformers, as an Earth surface potential 
[15]. A uniform electric field is “conservative,” meaning the integration of the 
electric field is not dependent on the chosen path; thus, the integral around the 
closed loop is zero [15]. The integral around a closed loop is no longer zero when 
realistic electric fields are considered, due to the vector function component of a 
realistic field [15]. It has been shown that modeling realistic geoelectric fields 
with the ground source method is incorrect [15]. The fields should be modeled as 
voltage sources in the transmission lines, in accordance with Equation (2). 
When performing the line integration of the electric field, it is very 
important to consider the direction of the field. For example, if a transmission line 
is perpendicular to the direction of the geoelectric field, there will be no induced 
voltage in that line, since the dot product, seen in Equation (2), will return a value 
of zero. Depending on the topology of the power system, it could be extremely 
vulnerable to certain orientations of geoelectric fields, and unaffected by other 
orientations. Consider the system below in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7. GIC flow and voltage source placement 
Notice the flow of GIC in the power system shown in Figure 7. The GIC 
enters and exits through the grounded neutral of the wye connected transformer. 
With the combined knowledge of the induced transmission line voltage sources 
and a power system’s substation grounding and transformers design, the GIC can 
be calculated. Since GIC is low frequency, below 1 Hz, the system’s reactances 
can be ignored when calculating the GIC [8]. The GIC flows can be determined 
from solving the linear dc network: 
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The augmented admittance matrix seen in Equation (5) is altered to 
include substation neutral impedances. A sample calculation of a fictitious system 
is given in the following section. 
 
5.4 Sample GIC Calculation 
 
To demonstrate the calculation of GIC flow in detail, consider the four bus 
power system in Figure 8. The system has been exposed to a left-right geoelectric 
field of 1.5 V/km. The length of the transmission line between buses one and 
three is 100 km. 
 
Figure 8. Oneline diagram of an example four bus power system 
This system has two generators, two high voltage generator step-up 
transformers that are grounded wye, and a high voltage transmission line 
connecting the two transformers. The integration of the electric field has already 
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been performed and an inline voltage source value of 150.0 V results. The 150 V 
serves as an input to this GIC model. The brown arrows represent the direction 
and magnitude of the calculated GIC. Explicitly noted in the oneline diagram are 
the substation grounding resistances, transformer winding resistances, and the 
resistance of the transmission line. All of these values are required to accurately 
calculate the GIC. The GIC is calculated by first augmenting the system to 
include the substation ground buses and then performing nodal analysis. The 
system is augmented according to Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9. Augmented dc network 
The first thing to notice is that the diagram now includes buses five and 
six, with open ends on nodes two and four. The existence of the delta connection 
between buses 1 and 4, and buses 2 and 3, prevents the GIC from flowing through 
generators. The inline voltage source has been converted to its Norton equivalent, 
and will serve as a current injection in the Nodal analysis. Also, consistency in 
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single phase, or three phase value of resistance is of high importance. As 
mentioned before, the GIC enters and exits through the grounded transformers, 
but it splits evenly among the three phases of the transmission line. In the 
following calculations, three phase resistance values are used. Symbolically, 
Equation (5) evaluates to  
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Since the resistance of the generators is not known, a value of 1 is assigned, to 
prevent the conductance matrix from being singular. It should be clear that this 
number only assists in the matrix inversion. Since there is no current flow in the 
branch connecting nodes four and five, the assigned resistance does not matter, as 
long as the chosen value does not make the matrix ill-conditioned. Substituting 
the values into Equation (6) and solving, the following dc voltages result: 
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The three-phase GIC flow can now be calculated by Ohm’s law, in accordance 
with the system topology, 
                                                                  
31 
 
The GIC in each phase of the transmission line can be found by dividing the three 
phase GIC by three, to achieve 31.25 A.  
 
5.5 Reactive Power Demand of a GIC Saturated Transformer 
 
Figure 8 also shows the amount of GIC losses, or Mvar demand, of the 
transformer, determined from the GIC calculation. Here, the Mvar demand of the 
transformer due to the GIC is modeled with a linear mapping of the GIC, varying 
with a voltage squared term. Research is under way to determine the best way to 
model the Mvar losses. Currently, the research is leaning towards a constant 
current model, since the Mvar loss varies linearly with current. It is understood 
that different transformer types will demand reactive power differently under GIC 
conditions [17] and [18]. Depending on the transformer’s core design, different 
coefficients are used to map the Mvar demand due to GIC [18]. These coefficients 
are regressed from Figure 10. 
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          Figure taken from [18] 
Figure 10. The variation of the Mvar consumption vs. the input GIC per phase 
 
The harmonics generated by the transformer saturation are not included in 
the GIC losses. The reactive power demand of the transformer is calculated with 
only the fundamental component and the exciting current [17], [18]. The 
calculation is given in [18] by Equation (9) with coefficients listed in Table 3. 
                                                                    
GIC is the total three phase GIC. Q0 is the reactive power loss due to the exciting 
current. The coefficient dependent on the core type is k1, given in Table 3. 
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Table 3. Coefficients for different core types 
Core Design k1 
Single phase 1.18 
Three-phase, shell form 0.33 
Three-phase, 3-legged, core 
form 
0.29 
Three-phase, 5-legged, core 
form 
0.66 
 
As shown in Equation (9) and Table 3, the Mvar demand can vary 
significantly depending on the transformer’s core type. Also seen in Equation (9), 
the reactive power demand of the transformer increases with the GIC. The 
generation of a system must be increased in order to support the demanded 
reactive power as the GIC increases. The increased current, due to the increased 
generation, translates into voltage drops across the system as losses are seen in the 
transmission lines, as experienced by Québec in 1989 [4]. Consider the EPRI 20 
bus case with nominal loading of 4700 MW and 1800 Mvar in Figure 11. 
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Figure 11. EPRI 20 bus system at 4700 MW and 1800 Mvar loading 
The arrows in Figure 11 represent the real power flow in the system. 
Notice that no GIC has been induced in the system since the “Total GIC Losses” 
is 0 Mvar. As the GIC is increased, it is expected that the system will begin to 
experience a voltage collapse, as seen in Figure 12. 
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Figure 12. 2.2 V/km East-West geoelectric field on the EPRI 20 bus system  
The arrows in Figure 12 represent the GIC flowing in the system. It is 
important to note that the ac power flow solution and the GIC dc network solution 
are being calculated simultaneously. This allows for the study of voltage collapse 
in the presence of GIC. The ability to contour the system’s voltage at each bus 
allows for quick diagnosis of power flow problem areas. This problem is 
ultimately mitigated by reducing the amount of GIC in the system, which is 
described in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 6 
MITIGATING THE EFFECTS OF GIC
 
 
A blocking device on every grounded wye power system component 
would prevent GIC from entering the system. However, this is not a viable option. 
First of all, it is unclear what would happen if the system was ungrounded at the 
dc level. This could create safety issues and should be studied further. Also, two 
other major issues with protecting every high voltage transformer in the electric 
grid from GIC are time and money. In order to protect the high voltage 
transformers, a standard of protection must first be established across all utilities. 
Next, the transformers must be retrofitted with the GIC protection device.  With 
the next major geomagnetic storm imminent, the time required in order to protect 
the transformers is too long. It has been suggested that these devices be installed 
during existing maintenance periods [11]. This solution makes sense for the long 
term problem, but the near term threat is still present. 
 
6.1 WSCC Nine Bus – Short Term Case Study 
 
Consider the induced line voltages of Table 4, in reference to the WSCC 
nine bus power system [19], diagrammed in Figure 13. 
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Table 4. Line voltage inputs due to a GMD 
From 
Bus 
To Bus 
Line 
Vsource 
(V) 
6 4 -75 
9 6 -20 
2 7 0 
9 3 0 
7 5 20 
4 1 25 
5 4 75 
8 9 150 
7 8 150 
 
 
Figure 13. WSCC nine bus power system model under GIC distress 
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As before, the magnitude and direction of the brown arrows in Figure 13 
represent the flow of GIC. The increased Mvar demand on the system, due to 
GIC, is noted as “GIC Loss.” It should be apparent from Table 4 that a geoelectric 
field of left to right bias was imposed on the system. This can also be deduced 
from the direction of the GIC arrows. The longest left-to-right transmission 
corridor, bus 7 to bus 9, experiences the largest GIC. This is expected since the 
path of integration is the longest and parallel to the geoelectric field. If the 
geomagnetic disturbance is strong enough, the GIC will be so large that the 
system can no longer handle the reactive power being demanded. The system will 
then collapse, resulting in a system wide power outage. The GIC is entering into 
and exiting from the WSCC nine bus system through the grounded wye-
connected neutrals of the transformers. In the long term, a utility would want to 
study a variety of different storm scenarios to determine where to place a GIC 
blocking device. The most obvious solution is to have a GIC blocking device, 
such as [20], installed on the transformer connecting bus 2 to bus 7. This would 
prevent all GIC from entering the system at that transformer. Although the 
devices are expensive, they are far less expensive than repairing or replacing a 
high voltage transformer. At the same time, the expense in both time and money 
of installing a GIC blocking device on every transformer makes it impractical. 
The strategy proposed focuses on the short term scenario, explained 
below. Consider the scenario of utility X, operating the power system seen in 
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Figure 13, under the geomagnetic disturbance conditions of Table 4. The utility 
has no GIC blocking devices installed. Plans to install future devices are 
irrelevant at the moment because the utility has just received word from the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration that a very large geomagnetic 
disturbance is about to reach Earth. Given some previous knowledge of the storm, 
the power system operators are told the storm’s magnitude and direction. The 
power system operators then use their knowledge of the system to redistribute 
power in the system to limit the impact of the geomagnetic disturbance. 
If it were possible to open the line between bus 7 and bus 8, the 
introduction of GIC into the system would be significantly reduced. The wye-
connected transformer between bus 2 and bus 7 is no longer required to provide 
the power to the load at bus 8, and there is no longer a path for the GIC to flow 
directly between bus 7 and bus 9. The effect of the mitigation strategy is 
illustrated in Figure 14. 
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Figure 14. WSCC nine bus under short term mitigation 
The generator at bus 1 must increase its generation to account for the 
change in the power system’s topology. The power has been rerouted to the load 
at bus 8, and is now being supplied in part by the generator at bus 1. It is clear that 
the system’s vulnerability to a left-to-right geomagnetic disturbance is reduced 
with the outaged line. Power no longer travels as much in the left-to-right 
direction as it did before. Note the total amount of GIC loss in the system; it went 
from 85.0 Mvar to 11.8 Mvar, an 86% reduction. Utility X was able to keep all its 
customers in service and reduce the reactive power demand on the system by 
cleverly taking a line out of service. 
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6.2 EPRI 20 Bus – Long Term Case Study 
 
Long term mitigation strategies can be vastly different from short term 
ones. Here, the long term mitigation problem of interest is where to install GIC 
blocking devices, and how many are required. When considering long term 
mitigation strategies, it is important to analyze the system of interest under several 
different GMD events. The system needs to be resilient to storms inducing 
geoelectric fields at any angle. As mentioned before, a system may be mostly 
unaffected by a particularly directed geoelectric field but extremely vulnerable to 
a geoelectric field oriented in another direction. With this in mind, it would only 
make since to protect the system from the geoelectric field direction of most 
impact.  
However, it is possible that a power system could be vulnerable to 
geoelectric fields at a multitude of angles. Simulating the effects of geomagnetic 
disturbances on a system, while varying the orientation of the geoelectric field, 
will allow for a comprehensive study of the system’s vulnerability. Determining 
the vulnerability of a system should be the first step in the long term mitigation 
strategy planning procedure. 
Consider the EPRI 20 Bus system in Figure 15, with the substation located 
as noted in Table 5. The system is subjected to a 5 V/km storm at orientations of 
0°, 45°, 90°, and 135°. Northward corresponds to 0° and eastward corresponds to 
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90°. It is unnecessary to sweep the storm angle a full 360°. A 180° sweep is 
sufficient since the Mvar demand on the system will be the same if the storm is 
oriented in the exact opposite direction. The results are in Table 6. 
Table 5. EPRI 20 bus substation geographical coordinates 
Substation 
Latitude 
(Degrees) 
Longitude 
(Degrees) 
1 33.613499 -87.3737 
2 34.310437 -86.3658 
3 33.955058 -84.6794 
4 33.547885 -86.0746 
5 32.705087 -84.6634 
6 33.377327 -82.6188 
7 34.252248 -82.8363 
8 34.195574 -81.098 
 
 
Figure 15. EPRI 20 bus system 
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Table 6. Mvar demand due to a 5 V/km geoelectric field at different 
orientations 
 
Transformer 
Transformer 
Mvar 
Coefficient 
GIC Mvar Losses (Mvar) 
Totals 
(Mvar) 
From 
Bus 
To 
Bus 
0 
degrees 
45 
degrees 
90 
degrees 
135 
degrees 
1 2 0.5 37.1 428.7 569.1 376.2 1411.0 
3 4 1 36.0 99.5 176.7 150.5 462.7 
3 4 1 36.0 99.5 176.7 150.5 462.7 
3 4 1 43.0 122.1 215.6 182.9 563.6 
3 4 1 43.0 122.1 215.6 182.9 563.6 
20 5 1 720.3 542.8 301.6 475.9 2040.5 
20 5 1 720.3 542.8 301.6 475.9 2040.5 
6 7 0.5 77.2 310.2 515.8 419.3 1322.4 
6 8 0.5 77.2 310.2 515.8 419.3 1322.4 
12 13 0.5 82.4 188.2 183.7 71.7 525.9 
12 14 0.5 82.4 188.2 183.7 71.7 525.9 
16 15 0.7 238.0 83.9 210.9 317.4 850.2 
16 15 0.7 238.0 83.9 210.9 317.4 850.2 
18 17 0.5 173.0 21.5 142.6 223.2 560.3 
19 17 0.5 166.6 20.7 137.3 214.8 539.4 
  
Totals 
(Mvar) 
2770.5 3163.8 4057.6 4049.3 14041.2 
 
This particular system appears to be susceptible to geoelectric fields in all 
directions. This can be deduced by observing the total Mvar demand on the 
system at the bottom of Table 6. With the chosen 45° resolution, this system 
experiences the largest Mvar demand when the geoelectric field is oriented in the 
East-West and West-East directions, or 90° and -90°. Depending on the system’s 
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generation capability, available GIC blocking devices, and constraints, the 
optimal mitigation strategy can be very different. 
The total Mvar demand due to each transformer from all the storms is 
shown in the rightmost column of Table 6. These values can be helpful when 
determining where to place blocking devices. Placing a blocking device on a 
transformer prevents GIC from entering/exiting that point. The Mvar demand due 
to that transformer will be zero after a device is installed. However, it should be 
noted that the GIC in the system will try to find another path that it can exit, since 
it can no longer exit the blocked transformer. In some cases, blocking a particular 
transformer will have no effect on the overall Mvar demand on the system 
because the GIC will find an alternate path to exit. Consider blocking the two 
transformers between bus 20 and bus 5, shown in Table 7. The total Mvar demand 
for each storm was significantly reduced. On average, the demand on the system 
was reduced by 32% per storm. This 32% reduction could be enough to keep the 
system from experiencing long term outages.  
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Table 7. EPRI 20 bus system with blocking devices on the transformers 
between bus 20 and bus 5 
 
Transformer 
Transformer 
Mvar 
Coefficient 
GIC Mvar Losses (Mvar) 
Totals 
(Mvar) 
From 
Bus 
To 
Bus 
0 
degrees 
45 
degrees 
90 
degrees 
135 
degrees 
1 2 0.5 110.9 490.1 582.2 333.3 1516.5 
3 4 1 16.7 148.5 193.4 124.9 483.5 
3 4 1 16.7 148.5 193.4 124.9 483.5 
3 4 1 15.2 176.3 234.2 154.8 580.5 
3 4 1 15.2 176.3 234.2 154.8 580.5 
20 5 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
20 5 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
6 7 0.5 192.8 208.4 487.5 481.0 1369.8 
6 8 0.5 192.8 208.4 487.5 481.0 1369.8 
12 13 0.5 72.1 179.1 181.2 77.2 509.5 
12 14 0.5 72.1 179.1 181.2 77.2 509.5 
16 15 0.7 131.7 60.5 217.2 246.7 656.2 
16 15 0.7 131.7 60.5 217.2 246.7 656.2 
18 17 0.5 109.2 10.3 123.8 164.7 408.0 
19 17 0.5 105.1 10.0 119.2 158.6 392.8 
  
Totals 
(Mvar) 
1181.9 2056.0 3452.1 2826.0 9516.0 
 
Understanding the redistribution of GIC with added blocking devices is 
crucial to the future of this research. Placing a blocking device on one of the 
transformers between bus 20 and bus 5 will not help in any manner, other than 
physically protecting the transformer. The GIC will redistribute and flow into the 
parallel transformer. A simple strategy could be to block the transformers that 
have high Mvar demand coefficients. By blocking the transformers that are the 
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most physically vulnerable, the GIC will be forced into the transformers that are 
inherently less susceptible to the problem. 
This research will expand into the development of algorithms to optimally 
reduce the effects of a GMD on a given system. Geomagnetically induced current 
sensitivity analysis will aid in the development of these algorithms.  
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CHAPTER 7 
POST-DISASTER RESTORATION
 
 
As explained in Chapter 6, in the event of a near term geomagnetic 
disturbance, it is not plausible to protect all the high voltage transformers in the 
power grid. In the event a storm destroys several high voltage transformers, a 
proposed transformer bypass method is presented. If several of these transformers 
are destroyed, it is likely that the system will no longer be operational, and the 
users will be left powerless. Critical transformers can be bypassed and grid users 
will once again be receiving power. This is somewhat of a “last resort” method, 
considering the physical structure of the network will have to be changed. But, it 
is a viable solution to restoring power to the grid if the high voltage transformers 
are destroyed. They bypassing of the transformers is explained in this chapter. 
 
7.1 High Voltage Transformer Bypassing 
 
The power system of Figure 16 contains one high voltage generator step-
up transformer and one high voltage step-down transformer.  
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Figure 16. Four-bus high-voltage power system 
Each transformer is connected between a bus at 138 kV and a bus at 768 
kV. Figure 16 shows the nominal ideal voltages of the transmission system. In 
order to bypass the transformer, a transmission line is connected in parallel with 
the transformer. The power flows around the transformer, and now, all 
transmission lines connected to the transformers terminals are operating at 138 
kV, as seen in Figure 17.  
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Figure 17. High voltage power system with transformer bypassing 
Bypassing the transformers in this manner allows for the use of the 
original transmission topology. The only downtime the load sees is the time it 
takes the utility to install the patch transmission line. Figure 17 shows the 
system’s voltages after the transformers have been bypassed with transmission 
line. Since the transformers are being bypassed, the voltage and current are not 
transformed. The transmission lines will be operating at the pre-transformed 
voltage and current. There is concern that the current may be too high for the 
higher voltage lines; this concern is addressed in a 37 bus case-study in the next 
section. 
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7.2 A 37 Bus Case Study 
 
Studying grid operation after many transformers have been destroyed can 
help utilities. Critical infrastructure analysis can be performed in order to 
determine the critical high voltage transformers in the grid. In the 37 bus case, 
there are six high voltage transformers. By inserting contingencies in PowerWorld 
Simulator, each of the transformers can be disabled.  Since there are only six high 
voltage transformers in this study, it is simple to determine which transformers 
are crucial to the system. By trial and error, it was determined that as few as two 
transformers are required to maintain the full integrity of the system. If any two of 
the transformers were protected, the system suffered no outages. The 37 bus 
system is seen in Figure 18. This post-scenario study focuses on the event that a 
geomagnetic storm has occurred, and with no preventative measures in place, all 
six high voltage transformers in the 37 case system were destroyed. If all six 
transformers are destroyed, the outside generation has no chance of supplying the 
system with power, and the system will collapse. To be clear, the GMD event has 
already happened, and the system is no longer under GIC stress, experiencing 
Mvar demand. However, the high voltage transformers have been permanently 
damaged. As explained earlier, the destruction of several high voltage 
transformers could mean long term outages, lasting even years. In an effort to 
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restore power to the system quickly, two of the blown transformers were bypassed 
with transmission line.  
 
Figure 18. The 37 bus case study topology 
In the simulation, the transformers are bypassed by replacing them in the 
oneline diagram with a transmission line. The impedance of the transmission line 
is that of the pre-transformed voltage line impedance. The high voltage lines are 
now operated at a lower voltage so their impedance must be modeled with the 
impedance of the operated voltage.  In reality, the generator step-up transformer 
would be damaged. Utilities would bypass the transformer with transmission line. 
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Now, the high voltage line would be operated at the pre-transformed voltage since 
the transformer was bypassed. It is of notable concern that the current will be 
higher since the line is operated at lower voltage. The power flow solution, seen 
in Figure 19, accounts for the higher current by modeling the line impedance as 
the impedance of the lower voltage lines. 
 
Figure 19. Post GMD 37 bus system with destroyed transformers 
The arrows in Figure 19 represent the real power flowing through the 
system. It is important to notice that all six of the high voltage transformers have 
been removed from the system. Transmission lines have been installed to bypass 
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two of the critical transformers. The highlighted transmission lines have the 
equivalent impedance of comparable 138 kV lines.  The power flow solution to 
the one-line diagram shows the system is fully operational and operating under 
the constraints of each component. 
Bypassing the critical high voltage transformers in the power system after 
damage from a geomagnetic storm has occurred is more of a last resort solution. 
Utilities may be reluctant to spend hundreds of millions of dollars to protect their 
system from a 100-year storm. When the storm occurs, the damage to the 
transformers cannot be undone. Bypassing the damaged transformers with a patch 
transmission line is a viable solution to restoring power to the grid. Without 
bypassing the transformers, the outage could be more long-term since the 
inventory of high voltage transformers is too small and the time involved in 
installing the transformers is too large [4]. The point of this method is to restore 
power to as many of the customers as possible in a timely manner.  
Utilities need to study the impact of GIC on their systems. This will give 
them information to make educated decisions on how to deal with the effects of 
high-impact low-frequency events on their systems. Like most engineering 
problems, there are tradeoffs involved, which should be studied and evaluated. 
Utilities should evaluate the risk of an event and  plan appropriately. Being 
negligent to the idea of a HILF event having drastic effects on their systems is not 
a responsible answer.  
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
With the combined effort of modeling and simulation of power systems 
under the stress of a geomagnetic disturbance, future disasters can be mitigated by 
strategically protecting the critical/vulnerable points in power systems around the 
world from GIC. Once the models have been validated and incorporated into 
power analysis software, power system planning engineers can use tools to 
effectively reduce the impacts of GIC on their system. Mitigation strategies will 
be explored: transformer bypassing, installing of GIC blocking devices, power 
flow redistribution by intentional line outages, and load shedding schemes, to 
name a few. The importance of modeling the impacts of GIC on the low voltage 
system is still unknown and will be explored in the research. The most important 
parameters of the model still need to be identified. The short-term and long-term 
mitigation strategies of GIC need to be explored. From an operating perspective, 
operators must be ready to respond to a GMD event, given information of a 
storms arrival in a few hours to days timeframe. Long-term mitigation strategies 
become important when GIC blocking devices have been added to the system. 
GIC has the potential to be redistributed in the system since it can no longer 
enter/exit blocked points. How the GIC redistributes and how to appropriately 
plan for the redistribution is something that will be addressed with further 
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research. This allows for the development of a GIC “optimum power flow” 
algorithm. Topics of future research include: more detailed reactive power 
demand model of saturated transformers, effects of harmonics on power system 
components due to transformer saturation, a more in-depth look at modeling the 
interaction between the magnetosphere and the Sun, and the effects of GIC on 
lower voltage (sub 500 kV) networks, to name a few. This research has 
tremendous potential as the threat of a storm is imminent and the public becomes 
more aware of the dangers attributed to a GMD’s interaction with the power 
system. 
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